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RESOLVING TREATY TERMINATION DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Goldwater v. Carter
In December 1978, President Carter announced that the United
States intended to terminate unilaterally the Mutual Defense
Treaty 1 between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the United
States.2 The treaty committed both nations to the further develop-
ment of defensive capabilities 3 and to responding, in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes, to armed attacks
against the other party.4 The presidential decision was pursuant to
a treaty provision allowing termination of the agreement by either
party on one year's notice.3
The President, however, did not seek or receive the approval
of either the Senate or the Congress in terminating the treaty.6
As a result, members of both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district
court.1 They argued that the President's termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty, without any congressional concurrence, unconstitu-
tionally infringed upon the powers of the legislature.8 The plain-
tiffs in the case, Goldwater v. Carter, prevailed at the district court
level. After holding that current members of Congress had stand-
1 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178 [hereinafter
cited as Mutual Defense Treaty].
2 Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic
of China, 1978 PuB. PAEns 2264, 2266 (Dec. 15, 1978). See Note, Unilateral
Termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and
the Republic of China Pursuant to the President's Foreign Relations Power, 12
VA, m. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 133-35 & n.3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as VAi',.
Note].
3 Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
4d. art. V.
5 Id. art. X.
6 For a detailed discussion of the events leading to the termination, see
Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-
Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HAnv. Ihz'L LJ. 931, 931-41 (1978).
See notes 174-77 infra & accompanying text.
7 Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 617
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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ing to assert these claims,9 and that the political question doctrine
did not bar adjudication, 0 Judge Gasch enjoined the State Depart-
ment from implementing the President's notice of termination until
the approval of either two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both
houses of Congress was obtained."'
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed.' 2  The majority accepted the lower court's
decision on the issue of standing and on the political question doc-
trine, but held that the "constitutional allocation of governmental
power" between the executive and the legislative branches did not
require that prior legislative consent be obtained in order for the
President to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty.'3
In a summary proceeding without oral argument, the Supreme
Court vacated the circuit court judgment and remanded the case
with directions to dismiss the complaint. 4 Justice Rehnquist,
joined by three other members of the Court, stated that the dispute
presented a nonjusticiable political question.15 Two Justices ex-
pressly rejected this position, 6 while three others did not address
the issue.'
7
Neither the Goldwater litigation nor the events preceding it
settled the fundamental question of which governmental branch or
combination of branches may terminate treaties. Should the posi-
tion taken in Justice Rehnquist's plurality statement be rejected, 8
the constitutional aspects of treaty termination would be adjudi-
9 Id. 951-56.
3- Id. 956-58.
"1 Id. 965.
' 2 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (per curiam),
vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
13 Id. 709.
'4 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
15 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens joined Justice Rehn-
quist's statement. Id. 1002-06.
16Justice Powell, arguing for dismissal of the complaint as not ripe for
judicial review, rejected the plurality's application of the political question doctrine.
Id. 997-1002. Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued for affirmance of the circuit
court's judgment. He contended that the President's unilateral termination of the
Mutual Defense Treaty was supported by the executive's "well-established
authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign governments." Id.
1006. Justice Brennan flatly rejected the plurality's interpretation of the political
question doctrine. Id. 1006-07.
.7 Justice Marshall, concurring in the result, filed no statement. Id. 996.
Justices Blaclmun and White, dissenting in part, argued that the Court should
hear oral argument and give the case plenary consideration. Id. 1006.
18 Presently, the Rehnquist position is only one vote short of a majority. The
composition of the court may change, however, or all three Justices who failed to
reach the issue may reject such an application of the political question doctrine.
See notes 15-17 supra & accompanying text.
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cated in the courts. Even if the Rehnquist position prevails, how-
ever, and the judiciary is barred from passing upon the constitution-
ality of various methods of terminating treaties, the constitutional
issues raised by such terminations would continue to be of great
importance. Each President is sworn to execute his office faithfully
and to preserve the Constitution. " This oath, as well as the chief
executive's ultimate accountability to the American people, and the
threat of impeachment,2 0 ensures that constitutional issues will be
important in future treaty terminations.21
19 U.S. CoNsr. art. H, § 1, cl. 7. The President is also required to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. art. II, § 3. See L. HENKIM , FOREIGN
Arr~uns AND TnE CONSTrrUroN 38-39 & n.3 (1972) ("Presidents, finally, take a
solemn oath to execute their office faithfully and to preserve the Constitution..
and all of them have undoubtedly taken that oath seriously.").
20 The President is elected by the nation as a whole and is subject to impeach-
ment and removal from office by the Congress. See U.S. CowsT. art. II, § 4
(removal of President after impeachment by House and conviction by Senate).
21 It can be argued that President Carter's successful unilateral termination of
the Mutual Defense Treaty provides strong support for a plenary executive treaty
termination power. Past practice has played an extremely important role in
allocating governmental power between the legislature and the executive. See,
e.g., Corwin, Judicial Review in Action, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 658-59 (1926)
(advancing theory of "adaptive interpretation"); McDougal & Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy, 54 YAl L.J. 181, 186-88, 291 (1945) ("the continuance of
[a] practice by successive administrations throughout our history makes its con-
temporary constitutionality unquestionable"); Monaghan, Presidential War-Making,
50 B.U. L. REv. 19, 21-25 (Spring 1970, Special Issue); Rostow, Great Cases
Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L. Rzv. 833, 841-43 (1972). But
see Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 49-58 (1972)
(criticizing those who suggest that "usurpation of power by the President, if re-
peated often enough, is legitimized"). In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall,
the "constitution [is] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In short, a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned .. . may be treated as a gloss on 'executive
Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II."). But see Jonr MmasHAL.'s
DrxENSE OF MeCulloch v. Maryland 18-21 (G. Gunther ed. 1969), in which
Professor Gunther argues persuasively that later statements made by Marshall
suggest that his language in McCulloch does not support wholesale "adaptation"
of the Constitution to practical exigencies.
A single treaty termination by a President, however, does not amount to a past
"practice." This is particularly true when, as in the Taiwan treaty dispute, the
legislature vigorously opposes the executive's actions. In addition to the Goldwater
case brought by individual senators and representatives, the Senate voted 59 to 35
to adopt a resolution providing: "That it is the sense of the Senate that approval
of the United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense treaty
between the United States and another nation." S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REc. S7015, S7038-7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
There is also little unambiguous historical evidence of a plenary executive
power over treaty terminations. The State Department argued that twelve past
treaty terminations were "effected by the President without Congressional or Senate
action." President's Power to Give Notice of Termination of US-ROC Mutual De-
fense Treaty, Memorandum for the Secretary of State from Herbert J. Hansell, the
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B. Prior Analysis of Treaty Terminations
Despite a considerable volume of literature,22 the treaty termi-
nation issue has resisted the analytical efforts of both courts and
legal scholars. The vast majority of commentators share a common
and, this Comment contends, faulty analytical approach. Despite
obvious and important differences among treaties, 23 the treaty ter-
mination power has been regarded as applicable in the same manner
to all treaties. Once it is determined which governmental branch,
Legal Adviser (Dec. 15, 1978) (with attached appendix "History of Treaty
Terminations by the United States") [hereinafter cited as Legal Adviser's Memo-
randum], reprinted in Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations on S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 147-91 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Treaty Termination Hearings]. Convincing rebuttals have been made,
however, pointing to the presence of legislative involvement in many of these
situations. See Scheffer, supra note 6, at 979-86. Thus, the historical support
for a unilateral presidential treaty termination power is both limited and
ambiguous.
In sum, although President Carter's unilateral termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan might play a role in the development of a govern-
mental practice, there is little evidence that such a practice currently exists. The
treaty termination question remains open, and undoubtedly will be the subject of
future debate and controversy. Cf. Note, The Constitutional Twilight Zone of
Treaty Termination: Goldwater v. Carter, 20 VA. J. IT'L L. 147, 168-69 (1979)
("the breadth of the President's foreign affairs power and the question of his
authority to terminate U.S. treaty obligations remain unresolved and ripe for
future conflict") [hereinafter cited as VA. Note].
22 See, e.g., E. CoRaN, TrE PREsmE-NT'S CON=ROL OF FoRmGN RELAnONS
109-16 (1917); 14 M. WmmTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNAMONAL LA-vW 460-62
(1970); Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75
Nw. U. L. PRv. 577 (1980); Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in
the Making and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of
the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Emerson,
The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LExis. 46 (1978), reprinted in
Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 21, at 448; Goldwater, Treaty Termination
is a Shared Power, 65 A.B.A.J. 198 (1979); Henldn, Litigating the President's
Power to Terminate Treaties, 73 Am. J. INTL L. 647 (1979); Kennedy, Normal
Relations with China: Good Law, Good Policy, 65 A.B.A.J. 194 (1979); Nelson,
The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States:
Theory and Practice, 42 Mnw. L. Rev. 879 (1958); Riggs, Termination of
Treaties by the Executive Without Congressional Approval: The Case of the
Warsaw Convention, 32 J. Am L. & CoM. 526 (1966); Scheffer, supra note 6;
Note, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutional Con-
troversy Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mei.), 9 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & Por.y 239 (1980); Note, The President's Power to Terminate
Treaties: The Unanswered Question of Goldwater v. Carter, 14 J. IN'L L. & EcoN.
301 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GWU Note]; Note, Unilateral Presidential Treaty
Termination Power by Default: An Analysis of Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979), 15 TEx. INTL L.J. 317 (1980); VA. Note, supra note 21; V. I,. Note,
supra note 2; Reisman & McDougal, Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense
Treaties?, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1979, at 19, col. 1 (first of two parts) [hereinafter
cited as Reisman & McDougal I]; Reisman & McDougal, Can the President Uni-
laterally End Treaties?, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1979, at 17, col. 1 (second of two
parts) [hereinafter cited as Reisman & McDougal II].
23 See note 31 infra & accompanying text.
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or combination of branches, ought to possess the power to terminate
treaties, further inquiry ceases-that branch or combination of
branches may terminate all treaties. 24 No systematic attempt has
been made to determine whether different treaties require different
methods of termination.25
The position of the executive branch in the Taiwan treaty
dispute was that the President acting alone could terminate any
treaty.26 Advocates of this position have stressed the "international"
24 E.g., E. CoRwiN, supra note 22, at 115 ("the power of terminating the
international compacts to which the United States is party belongs . . . to
Congress alone"); Henkin, supra note 22, at 651-54 (the President has sole
authority to terminate treaties); Kennedy, supra note 22, at 196; Reisman &
McDougal II, supra note 22, at 17, col. 4 ("[T~he fundamental principles of a
democratic sharing of power, and of checks and balances to protect that sharing,
require that Congress be accorded a role In the termination of all agreements,
whatever the modality of their making, other than purely presidential agreements.").
Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("We cannot find
an implied role in the Constitution for the Senate in treaty termination for some
but not all treaties in terms of their relative importance. There is no judicially
ascertainable and manageable method of making any distinction among treaties
on the basis of their substance, the magnitude of the risk involved, the degree of
controversy which their termination would engender, or by any other standards.").
But cf. id. ("All we decide today is that two-thirds Senate consent or majority
consent in both houses is not necessary to terminate this treaty in the circum-
stances before us now.").
2 5 The unwillingness of prior commentators to consider the possibility that
different treaties should be terminated differently is exemplified by the debate
between Professors Henkin and Berger. Replying to Henkin's arguments, see
Henkin, supra note 22, at 651-54, for an exclusive presidential power to terminate
treaties, Berger wrote:
Consequently, I cannot agree with Professor Henkin that "termination
of a treaty by the President .. . is an international act terminating an
international legal obligation of the United States." ...
Professor Henkn's view that "many a treaty is not domestic law at all,
in that it has no domestic legal implications," can be countered by run-of-
mine examples to the contrary. Reciprocal tariff agreements self-evidently
have domestic implications. So too have extradition treaties and treaties
guaranteeing the safety of embassy personnel.
Berger, supra note 22, at 600 n.164 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Plainly, both Berger and Henkin are correct, as far as they go. No doubt
treaty termination involves abrogation of an "international legal obligation." See
text accompanying notes 34-36 infra. Yet, as Berger points out, numerous ex-
amples of treaties with "domestic legal implications" can be produced. This
Comment attempts to reconcile these two observations, by distinguishing among
treaties. Thus, the proper method of terminating a treaty will depend upon the
particular domestic and international implications of termination. For a brief sug-
gestion, similar to the approach taken in this Comment, that treaty termination
disputes be resolved on a case-by-case basis, see Treaty Termination Hearings,
supra note 21, at 355 (prepared statement of Herbert Brownell).
26 E.g., Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or,
in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 24-38, Goldwater v. Carter, 481
F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979), reprinted in Treaty Termination Hearings, supra
note 21, at 91, 121-35 ("it is for the President, under Article I, to ... terminate
-treaties") (emphasis added); Legal Adviser's Memorandum, supra note 21, at 1,
reprinted in Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 21, at 147 (affirming Presi-
dent's power to terminate treaties acting alone).
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aspects of treaty termination, 27 and have relied heavily upon the
President's "foreign affairs" power.28 In response, proponents of
legislative powers have argued that some sort of legislative partici-
pation is constitutionally required in all treaty terminations.29 This
position emphasizes the status of treaties as the "supreme Law of
the Land," and concludes that the termination of a treaty consti-
tutes a repeal of domestic law-an act beyond the constitutional
powers of the executive.30
This Comment begins by arguing that different treaties may
require different termination processes. The United States is party
to a wide variety of treaties,3 1 each of which is a unique legal in-
strument with unique legal consequences. 2 The extraordinary
diversity in the subject matter and the legal consequences of exist-
ing treaties suggests that different treaty terminations will implicate
different governmental interests and political concerns. Thus, a
termination procedure that satisfactorily responds to the interests
raised in one context may be an inadequate response to different
concerns arising from the termination of a different treaty. After
isolating the more significant governmental interests that may be
implicated by the termination of a treaty, the Comment proposes a
2 7 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 22, at 652 ("Termination of a treaty is an
international act, and the President, and only the President, acts for the United
States in foreign affairs."); Kennedy, supra note 22, at 195-96; GWU Note, supra
note 22, at 319.
2 sSee, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 704-07 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("In short, the determination of the conduct of the United States in regard to
treaties is an instance of what has broadly been called the 'foreign affairs power'
of the President."). See notes 37-64 infra & accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 22, at 622 (arguing for some sort of legislative
participation in all treaty terminations); Goldwater, supra note 22; Reisman &
McDougall I & II, supra note 22.
30 Goldwater, supra note 22, at 198-99; Reisman & McDougal I, supra note 22,
at 19, col. 3. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 962 (D.D.C. 1979)
("Termination of a treaty also involves a repeal of the 'law of the land' established
by the agreement.").
31 Compare Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 3918, T.I.A.S. No. 8409 and North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat.
2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 and Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms,
Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, T.I.A.S. No. 7808. See generally U.S. DEP'T oF
STATE, TEATIEs IN FORCE (1980).
3 2 See N. LEECH, C. OLrvER & J. SwvzEuY, TnE INTERNATIONAL LECAL.
SYsTEm 929 (1973) ("Like contracts or trusts in private law, international agree-
ments are cut to the cloth of the interests of the parties.") [hereinafter cited as
N. LEECH]; id. 931 ("every treaty constitutes obligations and rights that, prior to
the conclusion of the treaty, had not yet existed, obligations and rights which come
into existence by the treaty") (quoting H. KE.sEN & R. TUcKER, PuNciPLEs OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (2d ed. 1966)). See text accompanying notes 33-3G
and 74-75 infra.
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balancing test designed to assess the strength of these interests in
particular situations.
The Comment concludes by arguing that because of the un-
settled nature of separation of powers doctrine, it often will be
difficult to obtain clear-cut answers to the question who may termi-
nate a treaty. Consequently, many of the substantive conclusions
that are reached-by the proposed balancing test or otherwise-will
be open to considerable dispute. It is thus particularly important
that a meaningful and accepted procedure for making this decision
be developed. A process encouraging consultation, discussion, and
perhaps compromise between the executive and legislative branches
will help to ensure that many termination disputes never arise or
are quickly settled. This Comment proposes one possible procedure.
II. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IMPLICATED By
TREATY TERMINATION
This section examines four aspects of treaty termination-first,
the international legal effects of a treaty termination; second, the
domestic legal effects of a treaty termination; third, the subject mat-
ter of the treaty; and fourth, the "fundamentalness" or importance
of the treaty to American foreign policy. It is argued that each
of these aspects gives rise to competing executive and legislative
interests in making treaty termination decisions.
A. International Effects of Treaty Termination and
Presidential Interests
The making of a treaty has a number of legal consequences
in both international and domestic law.33 Chief among these are
the international rights and obligations created by a treaty. Nations
party to an agreement are bound to fulfill these obligations in good
faith.84 Because of these obligations, a treaty termination has two
33 "For clarity of analysis, it is thus well to distinguish between treaty-malng
as an international act and the consequences which flow domestically from such
act:' Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (per curiam),
vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); L.
HENmY, supra note 19, at 129-71; VA. Note, supra note 21, at 161. See note 32
supra & accompanying text.
34 The international obligation created by an international agreement is sub-
ject to the rule of customary international law, pacta sunt servanda, requiring that
treaty obligations be fulfilled in good faith by parties to the agreement. H. KELSEN
& R. Tucuan, supra note 32, at 456, reprinted in N. LExcr, supra note 32, at 931.
This rule of customary international law has been "codified" in the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention on the
1981] 1195
1196 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
principal international consequences. First, termination of a treaty
relieves a nation of potential liability in international law for
failure to fulfill its agreement." Second, a treaty termination de-
prives a nation of the right to protest, or take other action, against
former parties to the agreement for their failure to fulfill agreed-
upon courses of conduct.
8 6
1. The President's Foreign Affairs Power
Any discussion of the governmental interests implicated by an
alteration of the international legal rights and obligations of the
United States must begin with the executive's "foreign affairs"
power.37 Although there is no longer any question that the na-
tional government possesses the constitutional power to engage in
the conduct of foreign affairs,38 there is considerable dispute sur-
rounding the allocation of that power between the legislative and
executive branches. 39 Professor Corwin has commented that the
Constitution is "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of direct-
ing American foreign policy." 40 The invitation has been accepted
frequently; disputes between the President and the Congress over
the control of foreign policy have been a recurrent feature of
American political history.41 Notable examples include the de-
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875, 884 (1969).
35 Among other reactions, breach of an international agreement could result in
diplomatic protest, see generally VI G. HAcKwoRTH, DIEST OF INTMNATIONAL
LAW 1-159 (1943), or the initiation of action before a multinational organization,
such as the International Court of Justice, see 12 M. Wm=MwA, supra note 22,
at 1153-471.
36 See H. KEmSEN & R. TuckER, supra note 32, at 456, reprinted in N. LEcH,
supra note 32, at 931 ("The statement that the treaty has 'binding force' means
nothing but that the treaty is or creates a norm establishing obligations and rights
of the contracting parties.").
3 7 See generally L. HEN=N, supra note 19, at 37-65.
38 Id. 15-35.
39 Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
wrote that constitutional language and historical precedent are "almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoah." 343
U.S. 579, 634 (1952). See E. CoawiN, supra note 22; L. HENEI, supra note 19,
at 31-35, 89-92; Q. WEIGHT, TsE CONTROL OF AMracAN FoRmcN RELATIoNS 3
(1922) ("There is no phase of American constitutional law on which com-
mentators have found it more difficult to procure a logical and consistent theory
than the control of foreign relations.").
40E. CORWIN, Tim PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PoWERs 208 (3d ed. 1948).
41 For discussions suggesting that controversy over the control of foreign policy
was frequent in the earliest days of the republic, see A. SoFAEB, WAR, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (1976) and Sofaer, The Presidency, War,
and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 12
(Spring 1976).
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bates between "Pacificus" and "Helvidius" in the first days of the
republic,4 the debate between Senators Spooner and Bacon over
President Theodore Roosevelt's conduct of foreign affairs, 43 the War
Powers Resolution," and of course, the treaty termination dispute.
Although vigorously contested, these disputes generally have
been resolved in favor of increased executive foreign affairs powers.4"
The result, as commentators have recognized, has been the develop-
ment of broad presidential authority over the conduct of foreign
policy.46  In the words of Professor Henkin, "All will agree that
by constitutional exegesis, by inferences and extrapolations small
and large ...Presidents have achieved and legitimated an undis-
puted, extensive, predominant, sometimes exclusive 'foreign affairs
power' . . .." 47 A number of attempts by Congress in the last
decade to assert control over the making of foreign policy 48 may
mark a slowing or reversal of this trend.49 Absent a truly radical
42 After President Washingtons proclamation in 1793 of U.S. neutrality in
hostilities between France and Britain, Alexander Hamilton, under the pseudonym
"Pacificus," authored eight articles in defense of the President's action. Madison,
writing under the name "Helvidius," responded with five pieces attacking the
constitutionality of Washington's actions. See E. CORWIN, supra note 22, at 7-32.
43 Id. 168-204.
44 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548)
(H.R.J. Res. 542, adopted over a presidential veto on November 7, 1973). The
War Powers Resolution specifically enumerates the circumstances in which deploy-
ment of U.S. military forces abroad is permitted, and purports to limit executive
authority to so employ the armed forces. See L. TroEm, AlmCAN CoNsTrrtrnoArL
LAw 176-78 (1978); Rostow, supra note 21, See also Casper, Constitutional
Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model,
43 U. Cm. L. REv. 463 (1976).
45 See, e.g., A. SoFAm, supra note 41; Patterson, The Rise of Presidential
Power Before World War II, 40 L. & CON;TEmP. PROB. 39 (Spring 1976).
46 E. CoRwiN, supra note 22, at 207 ("On the whole, therefore, the net result
of a century and a quarter of contest for power and influence in determining the
international destinies of the country remains decisively and conspicuously in
favor of the President."); L. TBmE, supra note 44, at 163 ("In the area of foreign
affairs, however, there is wide agreement at least that the President is invested with
great power."); Q. WmorHT, supra note 39, at 140 ("those favoring the executive
prerogative have the better of the argument," but advancing theory of a fourth
governmental department to control foreign policy); King & Leavens, Curbing the
Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HAnv. INT'L L.J. 55, 61-62 (1977);
Monaghan, supra note 21, at 23-25. Cf. I. DEsTLEn, PREsmNvTs, BUREAUCRATS,
AND FoREIN Poucy (1972) (proposing institutional changes for achieving more
centralized conduct of foreign policy).
47 L. IIENmN, supra note 19, at 44.
48 The 1970s were marked by a number of congressional efforts to reclaim a
voice in the formulation of foreign policy. Notable examples of the new mood
of legislative assertiveness include cutting off funds for the bombing of Cambodia,
the War Powers Resolution, and the debates surrounding the Panama Canal
treaties. See T. FRANcK & E. WsBAsm, FomGN Poracy BY CoNcnEss (1979).
49 Professors Franck and Weisband forcefully make this argument. Id. 3.
While recognizing that increased legislative initiatives In the field of foreign
affairs have led to "circus-like aspects of the Congressional debates on Panama[j
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restructuring of American government, however, expansive presi-
dential power over foreign affairs seems likely to continue.50
The rise of presidential power occurred with little obvious
support from the text of the Constitution. The Framers, while
generously supplying Congress with express grants of powers relat-
ing to the conduct of foreign affairs, 51 provided the executive with
little in the way of specific foreign affairs powers.52 Nonetheless,
proponents of expansive presidential powers have formulated a
number of theories justifying the President's claims to power over
foreign policy.53 The acceptance of one such formulation by the
. . . idiosyncratic subcommittee chairmen, self-aggrandizing staffers, incompre-
hensible requirements for Executive reporting to Congress, and dense jungles of
legislation with impenetrable tangles of standards, roamed by monstrous sub-
ordinate clauses," id. 8, Franck and Weisband generally approve of the "revolu-
tion" in foreign policy-making. Conceding that "tihe legislative branch has
yet to build a convincing delivery system or to win its battle of the attention
span," id. 9, Franck and Weisband conclude that, after Watergate and Vietnam, a
broad presidential foreign affairs power is a risk that can no longer be taken.
Id. 293.
For further discussion of congressional efforts to win a voice in the making
of foreign policy, see Balmer, The Use of Conditions in Foreign Relations Legis-
lation, 7 DEr. J. INT'L L. & Pot'y 197 (1978); Sparkman, Checks and Balances in
American Foreign Policy, 52 IND. L.J. 433 (1977).
50 President Carter's handling of the Taiwan treaty termination and the Iranian
hostage crisis indicate that, despite recent congressional assertiveness, executive pre-
eminence in the area of foreign policy is unlikely to be easily shaken. Accord,
Allison, Making War: The President and Congress, 40 L. & CONTEmP. PoaB. 86,
105 (Summer 1976).
51 See note 125 infra; L. HEN=N, supra note 19, at 37.
52 Id. ("A stranger reading the Constitution would get little inkling of such
large Presidential authority, for the powers explicitly vested in him are few and
seem modest, far fewer and more modest than those bestowed upon Congress.").
53 These theories have been discussed extensively elsewhere and are only
summarized here.
(1) Alexander Hamilton argued that the Constitution's grant of "The Ex-
ecutive Power" to the President provided him with a variety of inherent powers,
including broad authority in the field of foreign affairs. E. CoRwiN, supra note 22,
at 8-15 (quoting Hamilton's article of June 29, 1793, under the pseudonym
Pacificus).
(2) Justice Sutherland theorized that the power to conduct foreign relations
is inherent in the notion of national sovereignty. The President may wield this
inherent power largely free of the ordinarily applicable checks and balances of the
Constitution. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-22
(1936).
(3) Successive Presidents have claimed broad undefined authority to protect
the interests of the nation. See T. RoosEvELT, AN AtrroBIOcApHY 371-72 (1914),
quoted in L. HEImN, supra note 19, at 39-40; R. NixON, A NEw RoAD FoR
AMERICA 675 (1972) (claiming "the right of the President of the United States
under the Constitution to protect the lives of American men").
(4) Commentators, through liberal interpretation of the Constitution's express
grants of power to the President, have found textual support for a broad executive
foreign affairs power. See, e.g., L. I-HNKIN, supra note 19, at 41-42.
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Supreme Court, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,"
indicates the appeal exercised by broad claims of executive power.
The Curtiss-Wright Court described the executive's authority as
"the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations." 55 This sweeping dictum is plainly overbroad, 5&
and has generated considerable controversy.57  It nevertheless lends
support to claims of expansive presidential power over foreign
policy-making.
Executive claims to broad foreign affairs powers are supported
by several other arguments. It was pointed out in The Federalist
that both the conduct and the policy-making of foreign affairs re-
quire characteristics uniquely possessed by the executive branch,;"
(5) The Constitution is to be interpreted in light of evolving governmental
practices. This "gloss of life" uses the extensive authority actually exercised by the
executive as theoretical justification for presidential powers. See note 21 .supra.
For additional discussion of theoretical justifications for an expansive executive
foreign affairs power, see L. HENmN, supra note 19, at 15-65 and Van Alstyne,
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of
the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause,
40 L. & CoNTm. n'EoB. 102, 132-33 (Spring 1976).
54 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
65Id. 320. This language is frequently cited. E.g., L. TamE, supra note 44,
at 164; Henkin, supra note 22, at 652; VA. Note, supra note 21, at 153.
Curtiss-Wright echoed John Marshall's classic statement: "The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations." 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 10 Asa-Ar.s OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
56 Compare
When the Supreme Court addressed the question in Curtiss-Wright, it
recognized the 'very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations . . . .' A power so characterized, I believe, implies the authority
to make the kind of decision that has to be made for the United States
when a treaty no longer serves our interests ....
Henkin, supra note 22, at 652 (footnote omitted) with
Such conclusion [that the President may unilaterally terminate a treaty]
cannot rationally be derived from the notion of the president as the prin-
cipal "organ" of our country in external affairs; that function, historically,
has been exhausted in the conduct of negotiations and in the utterances
and notices of ratification and termination. Such a conclusion would
corrupt the built-in safeguards in our check-and-balance system.
Reisman & McDougal I, supra note 22, at 19, col. 3.
B See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 45 ("It is not apparent that either
'foreign affairs power' or 'sole organ' [in the Curtiss-Wright and John Marshall char-
acterizations, respectively] aspires to legal precision ... :').
5s Alexander Hamilton described the strengths of the executive branch in the
field of foreign affairs as follows: "Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of
foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and
uniform sensibility to national character; decision, SECRECY, and despatch ....-
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-the ability to act quickly, to provide coherent, centralized decision-
making and planning, to maintain secrecy, and to gather and as-
similate information. Similarly, the President has unique incen-
tives to act in the interest of the nation as a whole.50 The
executive's particular competence in the conduct of foreign affairs
can be contrasted with the many disadvantages the legislature faces
in the field. Numerous commentators arguing for a broad execu-
tive foreign affairs power have pointed to the "glacial legislative
process," the "excessively parochial" orientation of most legislators,
the "decentralized legislative decision-making process," and the
inability of the legislature to formulate and execute long-range
foreign policy.60
Some commentators, particularly prior to the Vietnam era,
vigorously urged that executive institutional competence in the
area of foreign affairs requires a restructuring of the division of
power over the making of foreign policy.' Thus, J. William Ful-
bright wrote:
THm FEDERALIST No. 75 (A. Hamilton), at 83 (Bourne ed. 1901) [hereinafter
cited as TBE FE:DERALST]. Indeed, even vigorous opponents of a broad executive
foreign affairs power have recognized that the executive branch possesses inherent
advantages in the field of foreign relations. See note 64 infra & accompanying text.
For a comprehensive treatment of the institutional strengths and weaknesses of
the executive branch in foreign affairs, see I. DEsTLRa, supra note 46.
59 The President, unlike members of Congress, is elected by the nation as a
whole. Similarly, the President is held responsible by the public for the well-being
of the nation. See C. Rossiter, The Presidency: Focus of Leadership in PMsPEcTrvs
ON THE P _smINCY 35 (S. Bach & G. Sulzner eds. 1974).
60 See note 58 supra and note 62 infra. Professor Henkin has observed that
"the President's control of international communication and of the daily conduct
of foreign relations has made it difficult, perhaps impossible, for Congress to
exercise its constitutional powers and responsibilities effectively, 'separately.'"
Henkin, "A More Effective System" for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional
Framework, 61 VA. L. REv. 751, 765 (1975) (emphasis omitted). Henkin also
argued that members of Congress frequently lack the information, understanding,
and interest needed to make intelligent foreign policy judgments, and attacked the
"maddening inefficiency of a two-tier authorization and appropriation process."
Id. 768. Others have pointed to more recent developments, including the "pro-
gressive dilution of party discipline," the "[dlecline in the authority of congressional
leaders," and the disruptive effect of the existing committee system. Manning,
The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FoREIGN
AFF. 306, 311 (1977). See also R. D~m, CoNcRESS AND FoREIGN POLICY 3
(1950) (The conclusion "is unavoidable that the national legislature . . . is re-
markably ill-suited to exercise a wise control over the nation's foreign policy.");
Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 Dtnx L.J. 619.
61Citing the institutional superiority of the executive, many commentators
have supported increased presidential authority over foreign policy. M. BUNDY,
THE STRENGTH OF GOvERNMENr (1968); J. BtrNs, PRESIDENTIAL GOVEPNMENT
(1966); I. DESTLER, supra note 46; W. ELLior, UNrIRD STATES FOREIGN POLICY
(1952); R. NEUSTAnT, PREsmENTIAL PowER: THm PoLncs OF L.ADEnsmp (2d
ed. 1976). See note 62 infra & accompanying text.
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[T]he United States is under the most pressing compulsion
to form wise and farsighted policies, oriented to a clearly
conceived concept of the national interest and imple-
mented by carefully devised and firmly co-ordinated spe-
cific lines of action .... The President alone can act to
mobilize our power and resources toward the realization
of clearly defined objectives .... 62
Although this view is undoubtedly an extreme one, there is a con-
sensus of sorts that the executive branch is institutionally more
competent in the field of foreign policy than the legislature.63 Even
the most ardent proponents of legislative powers concede that,
"[c]ould we view the matter as an original question ... [legislative
shortcomings] might persuade that exclusive power over foreign
affairs is best lodged in the President." 64 Taken together, the
-Curtiss-Wright dictum and the institutional strengths of the execu-
tive branch weigh heavily in favor of an expansive view of the
President's foreign affairs power.
62Fullbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-
Century Constitution, 47 CoRNrLL L.Q. 1, 12 (1961). Fulbright added, "The
source of an effective foreign policy under our system is Presidential power."
id. 2.
Noting the post-Watergate assertiveness of Congress in foreign policy matters,
Fulbright has since moderated his position. Fulbright, The Legislator as Educator,
57 FoamN AYF. 719 (1979). His apparent acceptance of expanded legislative
participation in the making of foreign policy, however, is conditioned upon the
creation of a "deliberative" legislature, whose members will abjure "political
salesmanship," the espousal of special interests, and the acquisition of personal
power. The likelihood of Congress ever fulfilling this conception is open to some
question, and, as Fulbright notes, "without a commensurate demonstration of
:public responsibility [by Congress], there is much to be said for a revival of
presidential leadership." Id. 727.
63A number of commentators, noting the strengths of the executive in the
field of foreign policy, have argued for a liberal interpretation of presidential powers
-within the existing constitutional framework. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 22, at
651-54; Monaghan, supra note 21. See note 61 supra.
Several commentators, on the other hand, have questioned the institutional
superiority of the executive in the field of foreign policy. See Berger, supra
mote 21; Casper, supra note 44; Katzenbach, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and
Secrecy, 52 FoRaN A.F. 1 (1973). Invariably, such arguments focus on per-
.ceived executive errors in the handling of the Vietnam situation. One com-
mentator has written: "The long-accepted assumption that Presidents and their
.experts alone possess the perspective and knowledge needed to define the national
interest in a hostile world seems to have been discredited to a considerable extent
'by the Indochina war and Watergate." Casper, supra note 44, at 483. See
Berger, supra note 21, at 83. These arguments misconceive the claims of ex-
,ecutive institutional superiority. By saying that the executive branch is better able
to conduct coherent, consistent, and successful foreign policy, one promises no
miracles. Rather, one tries to reduce the danger of mistakes. Vietnam was a
tragic example of presidential failures. It is. not, however, as some have suggested,
"proof" that the executive branch is ill-suited to the conduct of foreign policy.
64 R. BERGER, ExECuT PrIvmEGE 119 (1974).
19811
1202 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
2. The Presidential Interest in Treaty Termination
These broad, if somewhat controversial, claims of presidentiar
power are particularly strong when asserted in the specific context
of a treaty termination dispute. As discussed, the termination of a
treaty alters the nation's international legal obligations.65 The
President traditionally has exercised extraordinary power over a
wide variety of actions that have a similar effect on the nation's.
commitments in international law.66 For example, the executive-
has exclusive control over the recognition of foreign states and
governments, 67 the negotiation of treaties, 8 the making of (or re--
fusal to make) treaties once Senate approval has been obtained,
the initiation and settlement of claims for foreign reparations, 0 the
reception of foreign diplomats, 71 and the proclamation of U.S. in-
tentions in the area of foreign relations.72 This broad, yet accepted,
authority over the nation's international legal rights and obligations
suggests that the President should enjoy similar authority over
analogous acts which alter the nation's legal duties through treaty
termination.
An expansive view of the President's foreign affairs power lends
further support to this presumption of executive prerogative. As
discussed, the weight of both historical precedent and scholarly
opinion, as well as the institutional competence of the presidency,
suggest that the President should have a predominant role in the
conduct of foreign relations. Accordingly, because of the inter-
national consequences of treaty terminations, there is strong support
for substantial, and perhaps exclusive, executive control over the
65 See notes 34-36 supra & accompanying text.
66 For a discussion of the importance of past practice in constitutional analysis,
see note 21 supra.
87United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); E. ComviN, supra
note 22, at 205-06; L. HENmN, supra note 19, at 93; L. Tamr, supra note 44, at
165 & n.7.
68 E. CoRwiN, supra note 22, at 206; L. HENEIN, supra note 19, at 130-31.
69 S. CnANDAILi, TREATms, TBE= MAXING AND ENFONaCLNNT (2d ed. 1916);
L. HENKN, supra note 19, at 133.
70 Pink, 315 U.S. at 240 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("That the President's
control of foreign relations includes the settlement of claims is indisputable.").
See also L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 48.
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (The President "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers.").
72The doctrines and policies proclaimed by Presidents Monroe, Truman,
Eisenhower, and Carter are dramatic examples of the exercise of this power. In
the words of Professor Henkin, the President "acts and speaks the part of the
United States in the mysterious process by which customary international law is
formed." L. HENN, supra note 19, at 48.
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termination of treaties. Whether any congressional interest in the
termination of a treaty is sufficiently compelling to warrant a legis-
lative role in such actions, 73 and thus strong enough to limit the
President's rightfully broad powers in this area, is the subject for
the remainder of this section.
B. Domestic Effects of Treaty Termination and
Congressional Interests
Sole reliance on the international effects of treaty termination
and the executive's foreign affairs power fails to address important
domestic effects of treaty termination. 4 In constitutional terms, a
treaty is the "supreme Law of the Land." 75 To a large extent,
however, the presence of domestic effects is determined by whether
or not the treaty is self-executing. The Supreme Court, in Foster
v. Neilson,76 articulated the classic distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the
land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever
73 Determining the precise type of legislative participation in treaty termination
decision-making is problematic. Logical symmetry would suggest that two-thirds
of the Senate approve all treaty terminations. The functional approach suggested
in this Comment rejects this analysis, looking instead to the governmental interests
implicated by particular treaty terminations. Taking this approach, two points
support viewing the approval of a majority of each house as adequate legislative
participation. First, this is closely tailored to the principal legislative interests at
stake in treaty terminations--Congress's control over the law of the land and its
participation in the formulation of foreign policy. See text accompanying notes 84
.& 124-25 infra. Second, the requirement of two-thirds Senate approval has been
sharply criticized in the context of treaty making. See, e.g., McDougal & Lans,
-supra note 21, passim; Oliver, Getting the Senators to Accept the Reference of
Treaties to Both Houses for Approval by Simple Majorities, 74 Am. J. INT'L L.
142 (1980). Accordingly, it would be unwise to extend the requirement to
treaty terminations, particularly absent constitutional language so requiring. Accord
Berger, supra note 22, at 620-22; Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 21, at
308 (remarks of Professor Abram Chayes).
74 It is interesting to note that some commentators have focused primarily
-upon the domestic effects of treaty termination in arguing for legislative par-
ticipation in treaty terminations. See, e.g., Goldwater, supra note 22, at 199;
Reisman & McDougal II, supra note 22, at 17, col. 4. This approach, because it
ignores the international aspects of treaty terminations, is also unsatisfactory. The
better approach is one that integrates all the aspects of treaty termination-
domestic and international-and attempts to reconcile the various governmental
interests and political concerns that these effects implicate.
75 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land ....").
7627 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 52, 89 (1833).
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it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative pro-
vision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must exe-
cute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court.
77
Important legal effects flow from this distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties.
1. Self-Executing Treaties
When a treaty is self-executing, it creates domestic law identi-
cal to that of a federal statute. 78 Immediately upon its entry into
force, a self-executing treaty creates enforceable legal rights.7 9 It
supercedes prior inconsistent federal statutes, 0 preempts state laws
and constitutional provisions,' and is superceded by subsequent
federal statutes.8 2 In short, not only does the Constitution classify
self-executing treaties as the "Law of the Land," but many of the
legal effects of such treaties are indistinguishable from those of
federal statutes.
These characteristics of a self-executing treaty give rise to some
doubt as to the constitutionality of an exclusive executive power to
terminate such treaties. The Constitution, of course, does not in-
dicate how a treaty should be terminated. It does, however, estab-
771d. 314. See also Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S.
580, 598-99 (1884).
The determination whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing is a
question concerning the intent of the parties. L. HENIUN, supra note 19, at 156-61.
7 8 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See also Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
79 L. HmsNw, supra note 19, at 157-59. Henkin also notes that a treaty does
not become enforceable as the law of the land until proclaimed. Id. 158, n.H.
See cases cited in note 78 supra.
80 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF T=.E FOnEIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141(1) & Reporters'
Notes (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMiENT]. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
81 Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880) (state law disqualifying aliens
from inheritance preempted by contrary treaty); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.)
199 (1796) (state law voided by Treaty of Peace between United States and
Britain); RESTATEMENT, supra note 80, § 141, Comment c.
82 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599 ("[Slo far as a treaty made by the
United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance
in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its
enforcement, modification, or repeal."); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
616 (1871); RESTATEmENT, supra note 80, § 145. Federal statutes which supersede
a treaty as domestic law do not affect the international obligations of the United
States. Id. § 145(2).
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lish procedures, including a role for the Congress, by which federal
laws can be repealed.8 3 In determining how a self-executing treaty
ought to be terminated, these procedures should be respected.
There are at least two reasons for giving weight to such pro-
cedures. First, as noted earlier, both self-executing treaties and
federal statutes are classified as the "Law of the Land" by the
Constitution.8 Similarly, termination of a self-executing treaty and
repeal of a federal statute have identical domestic legal effects.
Thus, at least as an initial matter, it would seem logical to treat
one type of "Law of the Land" (self-executing treaties) in the same
manner that other types of "Law of the Land" (federal statutes)
are treated.
Second, many of the policy considerations that led the Framers
to require, and subsequent generations to affirm, legislative partici-
pation in the repeal of federal statutes apply with equal force to
the termination of self-executing treaties. Termination of a self-
executing treaty directly alters existing private legal rights.Y Such
an alteration may affect a number of groups whose interests conflict
with one another.86 It is precisely this situation, where numerous
competing interests are involved, that is best resolved by a demo-
cratic legislative process.87 In the words of James Madison, "The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the prin-
cipal task of modern legislation .... ." 88 Thus, the free-wheeling
legislative compromise resulting from competition between numei-
ous interests is accepted, in American political tradition, as the
surest way to achieve fair and popularly accepted governmental
decisions.89 Open public debate by elected representatives also
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. United States v. Clarke (The Confiscation
Cases), 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92, 112-13 (1874) ("No power was ever vested in
the President to repeal an act of Congress.").
84 See note 75 supra & accompanying text.
85ee notes 79-82 supra & accompanying text.
86 For example, the termination of a self-executing tariff treaty would affect
importers, exporters, consumers, labor, and competing industries, all in different
ways. These groups might be expected to have sharply differing views regarding
the desirability of terminating such a treaty.
87 A number of commentators have viewed the legislative branch as a kind of
marketplace in which representatives of different interest groups bargain for desired
results. E.g., J. BucAuNAsN, FaEErnoi iN CONSTrTuTONAL CoNTRAcT (1977); J.
BUcuANAN & G. TunIocK, THE CALcuLus OF CONSENT (1967); THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (J. Madison); Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. R.v. 1,
9-11 & n.25 (1979).
SSTHE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 58, at 65 (J. Madison). Madison
continued, "And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and
parties to the causes which they determine? .. . [T]he most numerous party, or,
in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail." Id.
89 See Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U.
Cm. L. 1Ev. 307 (1976). Dean Freedman argues for strict limits upon Con-
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contributes to popular acceptance of the legislature's actions.90 In
short, Congress, as an institution, is more competent to resolve this
type of problem than is the President.9'
Thus a self-executing treaty, in both constitutional language
and practical effect, is so similar to a federal statute that Congress.
can claim a strong interest in participating in its termination.
2. Non-Self-Executing Treaties
Congress's interest in the termination of a non-self-executing
treaty is considerably weaker than the legislative interests impli-
cated when a self-executing treaty is involved. A non-self-executing
treaty contains only an agreement to undertake future action. In
the words of the Supreme Court, it "import[s] a contract." 92 The
Court has repeatedly and explicitly held that, unlike self-executing
treaties, non-self-executing treaties do not create "Law of the
Land." 93 Thus, a non-self-executing treaty does not create legally
enforceable private rights or duties,94 does not supercede prior
inconsistent federal law,95 and does not preempt state law.96 Ac-
cordingly, termination of a non-self-executing treaty does not dis-
solve private legal rights or duties; if any such rights or obligations
gress's delegation of its taxation power, on the grounds that "no other institution
of the federal government except Congress possesses the unique characteristics that
the Framers relied upon to provide citizens with an institutional security against
unfair or oppressive taxation .... " Id. 326.
90The public acceptance, or "legitimacy," of a governmental institution is
closely related to the ability of that institution to perform its functions successfully.
J. FREEDMAN, CRIsis AND LEGr mAcY 10 (1978) (citing M. WEBER, THE THEOaY
oF SocrLA. AND EcONOM C ORGA iZA-nON 130-32 (T. Parsons ed. 1947)).
Alexander Hamilton made this point while defending the Senate's control of the
impeachment process. Thus, the Senate alone "would possess the degree of credit
and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards
reconciling the people to a decision... ." TnE FEDERAMIsT No. 65, supra note 58,
at 19 (A. Hamilton).
91 Dean Freedman advanced the concept of "institutional competence" in the
context of the delegation of governmental powers. Freedman, supra note 89, at
317-29. The notion is also applicable here: the external pressures upon the
Congress, as well as its composition and internal mechanisms, strongly suggest that
it will reach fairer, more popularly acceptable (if not more efficient) results than
would the executive. See Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process,
84 YA.LE L.J. 1395, 1411-12 (1975).
92 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
93 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. See note 75 supra.
94 Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 724, 242 P.2d 617, 622 (1952) (en
banc) (The United Nations Charter, to which the United States is party, is not
self-executing, and is therefore incapable of creating "justiciable rights in private
persons immediately upon ratification.").
95 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314 ("the legislature must execute the contract before
it can become a rule for the Court").
96 Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. 2d at 721, 242 P.2d at 620.
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exist, they do so by virtue of federal statutes that implement the
treaty and remain in force after its termination. 7 Similarly, neither
the making nor the dissolution of a non-self-executing treaty affects
inconsistent federal statutes or state law.98  Consequently, few note-
-worthy domestic effects arise from the termination of a non-self-
,executing treaty.
Because the domestic effects of such a termination are so
limited, there is little on which a legislative interest in participation
in the termination decision can be predicated. If, in effect, little
happens when the treaty is terminated, there appears to be no rea-
son to override the President's interest in controlling the nation's
international legal rights and obligations.99
C. Subject Matter of the Treaty
Another factor that affects the strength of the executive or
legislative interest in the termination of a particular treaty is the
subject matter of the treaty. The Constitution, and its historical
and judicial glosses, establishes a comprehensive allocation of gov-
ernmental powers between the executive and legislative branches. 00
For example, Congress is granted broad control over foreign com-
merce,101 while the President is provided with considerable authority
in military affairs. 102 This constitutional framework, although
often ambiguous, provides another focal point for defining the
treaty termination power.
Given the silence of the Constitution and the ambiguity of
historical practice 103 on the treaty termination issue, one should be
hesitant to define the power to terminate treaties in a way that
would interfere with more clearly established allocations of power.
Rather, the treaty termination power should be structured so as
97L. HENmN, supra note 19, at 157 n.j ("Strictly, if a treaty is not self-
executing it is not the treaty but the implementing legislation that is effectively
"law of the land."'). See also GWU Note, supra note 22, at 311 n.48.
9sSee notes 94-96 supra & accompanying text.
99 See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra.
100 For a rough outline of this framework, see Casper, supra note 44, at
486-88, and Henkin, supra note 60.
101 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has power "Etlo regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations." See S. RiEP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NE-ws 7186, 7186 (noting Congress's
special role in trade policy).
102 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States . .. ."). See A. SoFmm, supra
note 41.
'0 3 See note 21 supra.
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to conform to the existing constitutional framework of govern-
mental powers, and to minimize the disruption of present institu-
tional arrangements.
This approach to constitutional silence or uncertainty has been
adopted in analogous contexts. For example, the Supreme Court
has defined the President's power to remove government officers on
the basis of the type of officer involved, 04 seeking to preserve the
existing constitutional separation of executive and legislative
powers.105 Similarly, Congress's attempt to fashion a legislative
veto 106 over the exercise of delegated power has been examined
on a case-by-case basis by the courts. 10 7 Decisions have focused on
the "disruption" of the existing division of governmental powers
that various uses of the legislative veto create. 08 Thus, Justice
White has suggested that legislative vetoes in areas such as law
enforcement and presidential appointments would be more ob-
jectionable than those in more "legislative" areas.109 This type of
analysis, which attempts to conform an undefined governmental
power to existing institutional relationships, is equally valid in the
treaty termination context.
Two hypothetical treaties usefully illustrate this proposition.
First, consider a treaty regulating foreign commerce-an agreement
granting preferential tariff treatment to the goods of another na-
tion, for example." 0 Unilateral presidential termination of such a
treaty would thrust the executive branch into an area that the Con-
104 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
105 L. TAME, supra note 44, at 188 & n.14.
1o6 Legislative vetoes purport to allow Congress (or one house or committee)
to disapprove of executive or agency action without being subject to a possible
presidential veto. See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Ad-
rinistrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369
(1977); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 CoLum.
L. RPv. 1119 (1977).
1.07E.g., Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1980); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en bane)
(per curiam).
108 Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425, 429 (holding that the case involves a "one-house
disapproval [that] disrupts an essential function" of both the judicial and executive
branches); Atkins, 556 F.2d at 1062-63 (one-house veto permissible when "status
quo" not altered).
109 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 285-86 (1976) (White, J., concurring and
dissenting). Judge Leventhal has also distinguished between legislative vetoes in
cases involving "what is in substance legislative power" and those involving ex-
ecutive powers. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 664 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Leventhal, J., concurring).
110 E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United
States and Ireland, Sept. 14, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 788, T.I.A.S. No. 2155.
RESOLVING TREATY TERMINATION DISPUTES
stitution expressly commits to legislative control,"' and that Con-
gress has taken special efforts to regulate." 2  Termination of the
treaty by the President acting alone would cut across Congress's
efforts to regulate international trade. The resulting disruption
would provide strong support for legislative claims to participation
in the decision to terminate the hypothetical tariff treaty.
In contrast, consider a treaty dealing with military matters,
such as an agreement to restrict the use of various types of
weapons." 3 The President, as Commander in Chief, ordinarily
possesses broad authority over the nation's choice of military arma-
ments." 4 Subject to the broad limits of the appropriations process,
the President may deploy military weaponry as he deems appropri-
ate. Unilateral executive control over termination of a treaty
dealing with military weaponry would not thrust the President into
an area, such as foreign trade, regulated primarily by Congress.
Indeed, requiring congressional participation in the termination
of such treaties would interfere with the established powers of the
executive branch. Congressional failure to approve termination
of such a treaty could require the President to forego the use of
weapons he thought necessary, or, alternatively, to violate the na-
tion's treaty obligations. Absent a clear constitutional basis for
such a view of the treaty termination power, this type of disruption
should be avoided.
There may also be policy considerations, relating to the insti-
tutional competence of a particular branch, that suggest which
branch or branches should terminate a treaty. For example, the
President possesses a strong interest in unilaterally terminating most
"'1 See note 101 supra & accompanying text.
112 See S. Rm'. No. 1298, supra note 101, at 14. In recent years, Congress
has established a number of complex institutional arrangements requiring legislative
participation in the formulation of international trade policy. For example, recent
legislation establishes complicated procedures that the President must follow in
negotiating and entering into international trade agreements. Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976)).
See J. JAcrsoN, NTRNATioNAL ECONomic REILATIONS 128-30, 154-66, 816-24
(1977) (describing the Trade Act's attempts to curb executive discretion). For
a collection of the numerous statutes that regulate foreign commerce, see sources
cited in J. JAcKsoN, supra, at 154 n.19.
13 E.g., Geneva Gas Protocol, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No.
8061; Biological Weapons Convention, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No.
8062; Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
114 See note 102 supra. Even before the gradual accumulation of presidential
power as Commander in Chief during the 1900s, it was recognized that the ex-
ecutive's authority extended to "the command of the forces and the conduct of
campaigns." Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J.,
concurring).
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military treaties. Military affairs frequently demand unique treat-
ment; 115 secrecy, centralized decision-making, speed, and consistency
are of unusual importance in this area." 6 These requirements
are, in large part, incompatible with the open, decentralized, fre-
quently slow-moving give-and-take of a representative legislature." 7
In contrast, the executive branch possesses most, if not all, of the
qualities necessary for efficient and successful military decision-mak-
ing.118 Consequently, despite our ordinary preference for the public
debate and political compromise of the legislative branch,"19 there
might be persuasive reasons for permitting the President to uni-
laterally terminate a primarily military treaty.
Conversely, there would be strong policy justifications for re-
quiring legislative participation in the decision to terminate a treaty
dealing with foreign trade. The regulation of foreign commerce
requires reconciliation of the interests of numerous groups includ-
ing consumers, producers, laborers, shippers, and suppliers. This
is precisely the situation that the American political tradition has
placed within the legislature's control.120  Elected representatives,
responsive to various interest groups and to popular opinion, as
well as the give-and-take of the legislative process, have long been
accepted as the wisest way to reconcile such competing social and
economic interests.
D. The Fundamental Character of the Treaty
Another variable that bears upon the issue of which branch
may terminate a treaty is the importance of the treaty in the con-
text of the nation's foreign policy. It is difficult to enunciate a
precise standard for measuring the "fundamentalness" of a treaty.
There are, however, treaties that clearly are extraordinarily impor-
tant in defining the position and attitude of the United States in
world affairs-the North Atlantic Treaty,'2 ' the United Nations
15 J. BuRNs, supra note 61, at 208; I. DESTLEr, supra note 46, at 6 ("When
,one reaches the political-military sphere, however, the case for . . . [decentralized
.decision-making] becomes weaker, and the need for central control more urgent.");
W. ELmoTT, supra note 61, at 66.
1 6 See note 58 supra.
17 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
I'8 See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
119 See R. LTJcE, LEcIsTA= PnOCEDuRE 2 (1922); Katzenbach, supra note 63.
120 See notes 85-91 supra & accompanying text.
121 North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964.
[Vol 129:1189
RESOLVING TREATY TERMINATION DISPUTES
Charter,' and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, 28 for ex-
ample. These "fundamental" treaties lay the foundation for most
of American foreign relations, and their termination would radically
alter both the course of U.S. foreign policy and the place of the
nation in world affairs. Exclusion of the legislature from such
decision-making would severely curtail the congressional role in
foreign relations.
Although there is virtually no agreement on the scope of the
legislature's foreign relations power, 24 few would deny that the
legislative branch has some role in foreign affairs. 125 If the execu-
tive possessed the power to unilaterally terminate "fundamental"
treaties, it would be hard to avoid the conclusion that the legisla-
ture's foreign affairs power, no matter how narrowly it might be
defined, had been unduly compromised. Although there is likely
to be considerable difference of opinion as to the "fundamentalness"
of particular treaties, the importance of a treaty termination should
be considered in determining whether legislative participation in
the termination should be required.
III. A PROPOSED BALANCING TEST AND ITS APPLICATION
The preceding section has set forth several presidential or con-
gressional interests that may be implicated by the termination of
any particular treaty. The strength, and even the existence, of
these interests in termination will vary from treaty to treaty. A
sensible approach to the termination of treaties would recognize
and take into account these competing interests: the difficulty lies
in finding a workable test that will accomplish this accommodation.
122United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
See Jankowitsch, The Utility of the United Nations System, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
689 (1975); Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CosrP. L_
1, 2 (1978).
123 Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
That this treaty is "fundamental" does not necessarily mean that the President could
not terminate it unilaterally. For example, it is a military treaty, see text accom-
panying notes 113-14 supra, and that would have to be considered in the balancing-
test proposed by this Comment.
1
2 4 L. HENTI, supra note 19, at 76 ("No one knows the reaches of the
Foreign Affairs Power of Congress."). See generally id. 84-86.
125 Eleven of article I, section 8's enumerated powers relate to international
affairs in some way. L. TuEIB, supra note 44, at 275. These, and Congress's
"unenumerated foreign affairs power," L. HENmN, supra note 19, at 68, suggest
a far from insignificant role for Congress in foreign affairs. Nonetheless, as noted
above, see text accompanying notes 37-64 supra, the President has successfully
asserted, and commentators have generally approved, extremely broad powers in.
the field.
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Considerable criticism has been directed at balancing tests as a
solution to legal problems.126  This criticism is particularly appro-
priate when the interests being balanced are both imprecise and of
widely differing character. Nonetheless, the usefulness of balancing
tests in providing flexibility and in integrating a number of com-
peting considerations is undeniable.'21 Consequently, despite the
general criticism these tests have received, a balancing test seems
well-suited to dealing with the numerous competing governmental
interests and political concerns implicated by particular treaty ter-
minations. Indeed, it is difficult to posit an alternative test that
could reconcile these various interests.
Undoubtedly, many difficult cases will arise, implicating sig-
nificant legislative interests and political concerns against the sub-
stantial executive foreign affairs power, and perhaps against other
executive interests as well.1 28 The resolution of these cases might
occasionally appear to be ad hoc, resting more upon one's political
sympathies than upon a careful weighing of interests. As discussed
below, however, few arguments based upon separation of powers
principles will be entirely convincing.129  The dispute and am-
biguity underlying the subject make it difficult to attain consistently
126 Justice Black's opposition to balancing tests was well-known. E.g., City
of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 528-33 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 164-67 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting). See Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Bal-
ancing, 78 CoLum. L. REv. 1022, 1047 (1978); Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess,
57 TEX. L. REv. 1361, 1415-21 (1979). Cf. Authorities cited at L. TnmE, supra
note 44, at 582-84 & nn.19-27 (first amendment balancing controversy).
-
2 7 See L. TrtmE, supra note 44, at 583 ("First, the "balancers" [in first
amendment analysis] are right in concluding that it is impossible to escape the
task of weighing the competing considerations.").
128ne such executive interest might arise from a lack of any congressional
opposition to unilateral presidential termination of a treaty. Justice Jackson's
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952), has frequently been cited for its theory of "fluctuating" presidential powers.
E.g., Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451,
472-74 (1979). Jackson reasoned that (1) executive powers are at their height
-when "the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress," 343 U.S. at 635; (2) presidential powers are more limited, and vary ac-
cording to "the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables," id. 637,
when Congress has neither approved nor disapproved of his action, and (3) the
executive's powers are at their "lowest ebb" when the President "takes measures
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress." Id. Of course, if
Congress has explicitly approved of the termination of a treaty, there will be no
treaty termination dispute. If Congress, however, has remained silent, or spoken
only indirectly, a claim that unilateral presidential termination was authorized by
legislative action becomes far less persuasive. Nonetheless, consideration of the
second branch in Jackson's tripartite model would suggest an executive "interest"
of sorts in such cases. This would be particularly true where strong evidence of
implied legislative approval exists.
129 See notes 178-79 infra & accompanying text.
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persuasive results. Thus, although the proposed balancing test may
occasionally appear ad hoc or subjective, it is unlikely that any
alternatives could avoid this shortcoming. In sum, because of its
flexibility and capacity to isolate the numerous governmental inter-
ests and political concerns implicated by treaty terminations, the
proposed balancing test seems to be the best response to the treaty
termination problem.
A. Two Easy Cases
The foregoing analysis of treaty termination and the proposed
balancing test are usefully illustrated by two hypotheticals. The
first example assumes unilateral executive termination of the War-
saw Convention, 30 and the second posits a similar termination of
the Arbitration Treaty between Denmark and the United States. 31'
The Warsaw Convention "was negotiated in 1929 and is today one
of the principal multilateral agreements applicable to international
transportation. It establishes uniformity of documentation and
creates a uniform body of law with regard to the rights and respon-
sibilities of passengers, shippers, and air carriers in international air
transportation." 132 The convention is a self-executing treaty; thus,
it creates enforceable legal rights and obligations in exactly the same
manner that a federal statute does. 33 For example, the convention
creates a cause of action for those involved in international air acci-
dents. 1 34  Similarly, the treaty provides a two-year statute of limita-
tions for certain claims, 135 and establishes a variety of evidentiary
130 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention].
131 Arbitration Treaty, June 14, 1928, United States-Denmark, 46 Stat. 2265,
T.S. No. 784 [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Treaty].
13 2 DEP'T OF STATE, UNrrED STATES GOVEINMENT ACTION CONCERNING THE
WAsAw CoNvmmoN (1966), reprinted in 32 J. Am L. & CoM. 243 (1966). See
generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 Hanv. L. REv. 497 (1967).
133 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916-19 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (Warsaw Convention creates a private
right of action); Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912, 916
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The Convention itself is self-executing . . . ."); Smith v.
Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1971). See
,Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. Am L. & Com.
217, 218 (1959) ("[Tlhe author is convinced that the draftsmen of the Convention
intended to create a right of action based on the contract of carriage; . . . that
[the Convention] Is self-executing; and therefore the supreme law of the land.").
See notes 78-79 supra & accompanying text.
'34 E.g., Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 916-19; Calkins, supra note 133, at 218.
185 Warsaw Convention, supra note 130, art. 29.
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presumptions applicable to passenger and shipper damage claims.13'
Finally, the treaty places several limits on air carrier liability. 37
Termination of the convention would dissolve this legal framework,
generally replacing it with state law that would resolve issues dif-
ferently than the treaty does. 138
This type of change in the actual laws of the land should re-
quire participation by the legislature. Congress traditionally has
played a major role in altering private legal rights, and its participa-
tion in this process has been considered of fundamental importance
to the American political system. 3 9 This role suggests that legisla-
tive participation in termination of the Warsaw Convention should
be required.
It is no answer to argue that Congress is free to enact legisla-
tion that would recreate the legal framework of the convention.
This would require the affirmative action of Congress, which might
easily be frustrated, either intentionally 140 or otherwise.141 The
Warsaw Convention-containing a complicated web of legal re-
quirements-would be particularly difficult to reenact.142 In addi-
tion, Congress's reenactment might well face a presidential veto.
If the executive branch found the terms of the treaty objectionable,
it might well be disposed similarly toward identical legislation.
As a result of these obstacles to congressional reenactment of the
treaty's legal provisions, the President's unilateral termination
would have a long-lasting, as well as a direct, effect upon domestic
legal rights.
Two other aspects of the convention are important. First, it
deals with the subject of foreign commerce, an area specifically
granted by the Constitution to Congress's control.143 Absent con-
136 Id. arts. 11, 26.
'37Id. arts. 3,4,12 & 17-25.
138 See Riggs, supra note 22, at 533.
139 See text accompanying notes 85-91 supra.
140 Commentators have frequently pointed out the extent to which minority
interest groups may block legislative programs. E.g., Choper, The Supreme Court
and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
810, 817, 821-30 (1974) ("The most serious antimajoritarian forces in the con-
gressional system are . . . found . . . in the structure and inner workings of the
legislative process itself."). Thus, the enactment of legislation re-creating the
Warsaw Convention might well be blocked during the legislative process.
141 Congress might simply neglect to enact the requisite legislation, deeming
other duties more pressing. Similarly, disagreement over the precise form and
contents of the legislation might block its passage.
142The great number and complexity of the legal provisions of the Convention
would increase the likelihood of congressional disagreement, and therefore impede
passage of legislation re-creating these provisions.
143 See note 101 supra & accompanying text.
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stitutional language relevant to treaty termination, this express
grant should be important in determining how authority over
foreign commerce ought to be divided between Congress and the
President, even if such control is exercised by way of a treaty
termination. Second, the treaty, although not "fundamental" to
American foreign policy,14 is of considerable importance to inter-
national transportation. Thus, although clearly not analogous to
termination of the North Atlantic Treaty, termination of the War-
saw Convention would have more than a de minimis impact on
Congress's ability to participate in the formulation of foreign policy.
Balancing these interests against the President's interest in con-
trolling the nation's international obligations is, of course, difficult.
Nonetheless, the weighty legislative interests at stake in this hypo-
thetical strongly suggest that Congress should take part in the deci-
sion to terminate the Warsaw Convention.
145
This can be contrasted with termination of the Arbitration
Treaty between the United States and Denmark. The principal
provision of this treaty states that "[a]ll differences relating to in-
ternational matters in which the . . . [parties] are concerned" 146
shall be submitted to a "competent tribunal" 147 for arbitration.
The treaty also contains certain exceptions to this general require-
ment that international disputes be arbitrated.
148
There is little, if any, basis for asserting a congressional inter-
est in participating in termination of the Arbitration Treaty. The
treaty is clearly non-self-executing: it creates no legal rights en-
forceable in U.S. courts and requires future governmental actions
144 See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
145 The United States, in fact, has taken major steps towards withdrawal from
the Warsaw Convention in the past. In 1965, the President, through the State
Department, delivered notice of U.S. withdrawal from the convention. 53 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. 923, 923-24 (1965). The decision to withdraw was made without
formal approval from Congress or the Senate. Riggs, supra note 22, at 526-27
& n.5. See Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. Am L. &
CoM. 291 (1965). There was, however, prior informal indication of Senate
approval for the President's action. Riggs, supra note 22, at 527 n.5 (quoting
Senate Foreign Relations Committee report: if legislation regarding liability insur-
ance "is not enacted within a reasonable time . . . the Department of State should
take immediate steps to denounce the Warsaw Convention . . . .").
The withdrawal notice was intended as a negotiation tactic to win higher air
carrier liability limits. Arguably, a requirement of congressional participation in
the termination decision would unduly hinder the use of such tactics. It is equally
likely, however, that congressional participation would enhance the U.S. bargaining
position, by indicating a stronger national commitment. If flexibility were deemed
essential, the legislature could delegate power to terminate the treaty to the
President.
148 Arbitration Treaty, supra note 131, art. I.
147 Id.
148 Id. art II.
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if it is to be fulfilled.149 Consequently, termination of the treaty
would not involve repealing the "Law of the Land," and would
do nothing to alter the legal rights of litigants in domestic courts.
In addition, the treaty deals with a subject-the disposition of
the nation's claims under international law-that the President has
long exclusively controlled. 150 Termination of the treaty, unlike
the hypothetical termination of the Warsaw Convention, would not
thrust the President into an area that Congress ordinarily regulates.
Finally, the Arbitration Treaty is far from fundamental. It ap-
parently has never been used,151 and its importance has been
reduced by the establishment of the International Court of Jus-
tice.152 The treaty's termination would have little, if any, impact
upon Congress's ability to participate in making foreign policy.
As this discussion suggests, an application of the proposed bal-
ancing test reveals little basis for congressional participation in
termination of the Arbitration Treaty. The treaty's termination
would have no effect on domestic law; it would involve a subject
generally under exclusive executive control, and it would have
little impact on Congress's ability to make foreign policy. Given
this, unilateral executive termination of the Arbitration Treaty
appears entirely appropriate.
B. Termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty:
A Difficult Case
An excellent example of a difficult case under the proposed
balancing test is the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan-the
agreement that focused attention on the treaty termination issue.
5 3
The principal substantive provision of the treaty states that
"[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific
Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes." 154 Plainly, the provision contemplates only future gov-
ernmental action. Each party to the treaty "declares" that, if speci-
fied events occur, it will act "in accordance with its constitutional
processes" to respond. Thus, the treaty "import[s] a contract," and
149 See text accompanying notes 92-98 supra.
'
5 0 See note 70 supra.
151 Personal interview with officials at the Department of State, Apr. 19, 1981.
152 But see N. LEEcr, supra note 32, at 80-82 (arguing that arbitration has
remained important despite existence of International Court of Justice).
15 3 See notes 1-5 supra & accompanying text.
154 Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 1, art. V.
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should be regarded as non-self-executing.155 Termination of the
treaty, therefore, would not affect either the legal rights of U.S.
citizens or the "Law of the Land."
Turning to the subject matter of the treaty, the character of
the commitment made in the principal provision of the treaty is
ambiguous. Either a declaration of war by Congress or the use of
armed forces abroad by the President without a declaration of war
would constitute action "in accordance with ... [U.S.] constitu-
tional processes." It is therefore unclear whether the action con-
templated by, and thus the subject matter of, the Mutual Defense
Treaty was based upon the President's authority as Commander in
Chief of the armed forces or upon the power of Congress to declare
war.56
In addition to this ambiguity of the treaty provision, the under-
lying subject-the use of armed forces abroad-is a matter of con-
siderable dispute. 57  The legislative and executive branches have
long contested the constitutional authority of the President to em-
ploy military forces abroad in the absence of a declaration of war
or other legislative approval. The issue, as yet unresolved by either
the judiciary or the commentators,158 seems likely to remain unset-
tled for some time. 59 Consequently, the legislature cannot claim
1.55 The district court in Goldwater argued that many provisions in the Mutual
Defense Treaty, including article V, were self-executing. Goldwater v. Carter, 481
F. Supp. 949, 962-63 & n.60 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.)
(en bane), vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
This position was clearly erroneous. See L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 160 &
n.100; N. Lmscn, supra note 32, at 929; L. TumE, supra note 44, at 175 n.14
("As a rule, [collective defense] treaties do not appear to be self-executing.").
To reiterate Chief Justice Marshall's classic test, "when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the
Court." Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (emphasis added).
Plainly, a declaration to defend an ally at some future date is an engagement "to
perform a particular act," and not a law addressed to the judiciary for enforcement.
16 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 with id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
157 See L. TRIBE, supra note 44, at 173 (noting "meager elucidation in the
case").
15s Courts have frequently refused to address the legality of executive use of
force abroad. E.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (Marshall, Circuit
Justice, 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979 (1972) (denial of certiorari);
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (denial of leave to file bill of
complaint); Velvel v. Nixon, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) (denial of certiorari); McArthur
v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968) (denial of certiorari); Holmes v. United States,
391 U.S. 936 (1968) (denial of certiorari); Mor v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967). See A. D'AMATo & R. O'NEI.,
Tim JunIcrAnY AND VIETNAm 51-58 (1972); Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts of
the United States: "Political Questions", 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 284 (1969). See also
Casper, supra note 44.
159 Dean Casper has suggested that resolution, or rationalization, of the conflicts
between the executive and legislature can only be attained if Congress enacts
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primary control over the subject of the treaty, as could be done,
for example, in the case of a tariff treaty.160 Indeed, if anything,
it is the President whose claims have been most widely accepted. 16'
Similarly, historical precedent weighs against legislative control
over decisions to use armed forces abroad. 162 Whatever one's view
of their constitutional authority, it cannot be denied that Presi-
dents have frequently employed the nation's military strength
abroad without prior approval from the legislature. 163  Lastly,
several considerations of policy support executive control over this
type of treaty termination. As noted above, unlike many matters
involving economic regulation or individual rights, where openness
and popular representation should seldom be dispensed with, sub-
jects involving the military frequently require secrecy, unified
decision-making, and speed. 164 Thus, there would be good reason
to allow the President to terminate unilaterally the Mutual De-
fense Treaty: the executive branch is better qualified to make the
type of military decision upon which treaty termination is likely to
be based.
Admittedly, the justifications for plenary executive power over
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty are subject to some dis-
pute. The decision to terminate the Taiwan treaty involved both
"framework legislation," such as the War Powers Resolution. See note 44 supra.
Such legislation would serve to define the responsibilities and duties of the
President and Congress in areas now in dispute. Casper, supra note 44.
160 See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra.
361E.g., L. KoEN G, THE PiESmENcY AND TE CiusIs 46 (1944); A. SoFAEP,
supra note 41; Monaghan, supra note 21; Rostow, supra note 21. But see Malawer,
The Vietnam War Under the Constitution: Legal Issues Involved in the United
States Military Involvement in VietNam, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 205 (1969); Velvel,
The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attackable,
16 U. KANs. L. REv. 449 (1968).
162 See War Powers Legislation: Hearings on S. 731, S.f. Res. 18 & S.f. Res. 59
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 352-58
(1972) (statements of Professor Commager and Senator Goldwater). See also
Monaghan, supra note 21, at 31; Rostow, supra note 21, at 863-70.
163 "Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 instances
in which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain
positions abroad without obtaining prior Congressional authorization .... ." OFCE
OF THE LEGAL ADvison, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE LEGALITY OF UNITED STATES
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIET NAm, reprinted in 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101
(1966). See Monaghan, supra note 21, at 31.
164 For a blunt assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
executive and legislative branches in military affairs, consider the following state-
ment made in 1971 by Representative L. Mendel Rivers, then Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee: "I'd rather have one general who knows this
[military] business than a hundred senators who don't." A. FRYE, A REsPousmi
CoNGREss: Tim PorATrcs OF NATIONAL SEcuarry 5 (1975); Casper, supra note 44,
at 481.
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military 6 5 and non-military 66 considerations. To the extent that
broad foreign policy issues were involved, the need for speed and
secrecy might be reduced, and the need for public debate and legis-
lative participation increased. Nonetheless, qualities such as supe-
rior information-gathering capabilities and centralized decision-
making are valuable in making long-term strategic decisions.1o
7
Further, foreign nations may demand secrecy in certain types of
negotiations. - In addition, termination of the Mutual Defense
Treaty was prompted largely by military concerns.'68 Thus, al-
though perhaps not completely compelling, there are significant
policy considerations weighing in favor of unilateral presidential
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Termination of the Taiwan treaty arguably raised a final type
of political concern. If the treaty were regarded as a sufficiently
fundamental part of U.S. foreign policy, it could be argued that its
termination would so alter the course of U.S. foreign affairs that the
legislature's role in the area would be impermissibly compromised
by unilateral executive termination. 1 9 Undoubtedly, the Mutual
Defense Treaty was a significant agreement. For nearly three
decades it was the foundation of U.S. policy toward China. 70 Yet,
particularly after changes during the 1970s in American attitudes
toward the People's Republic of China, it would be an exaggeration
to claim that termination of the Taiwan treaty so fundamentally
and dramatically changed U.S. foreign relations that congressional
16; E.g., Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China:
Practical Implications: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. viii, xii-xvi,
7-13, 23-24, 24-42 (1977) (statements of A. Doak Barnett, Nathaniel B. Thayer, and
Robert A. Scalapino) [hereinafter cited as Normalization Hearings].
166Id. 247-320 (economic implications), 321-51 (political implications).
'
6 7 See generally M. BurqNY, supra note 61; J. BURNs, supra note 61; I. DESTLM,
supra note 46; W. ELLIoTr, supra note 61, at 67-113, 177-93; L. HmN , supra
note 19, at 37-65; R. NEtTSTADT, supra note 61.
168 The Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Be-
tween the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 1978 Pun.
PAPEis 2264 (Dec. 15, 1978), highlighted the importance of the strategic and
military considerations underlying the decision to "normalize" relations with the
People's Republic. Thus, the communique proclaimed that both parties "wish to
reduce the danger of international military conflict," and perhaps more importantly,
that neither "should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region ... and [that] each
is opposed to [the] efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish
such hegemony." Id. It has been observed that "hegemony" is "a euphemism
denoting the Soviet Union" in the diplomatic parlance of the People's Republic.
Normalization Hearings, supra note 165, at xii. See id. 28-34 (statement of Robert
A. Scalapino), 154-60 (statement of Donald S. Zagoria). See also Cohen, A China
Policy for the Next Administration, 55 FoBEON .Asr. 20 (1976).
169 See text accompanying notes 121-25 supra.
170 See Normalization Hearings, supra note 165, at xd-xii, 160-68 (statement of
Robert W. Barnett), 229 (statement of Hungdah Chiu).
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powers were unduly compromised. The role of the Mutual Defense
Treaty in U.S. foreign affairs was in no way comparable to that of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the United Nations.
The thaw in U.S. relations with the People's Republic greatly re-
duced the practical importance of the treaty; 171 there came to be
less to fear from the mainland. Similarly, growing Soviet power led
to a shift in U.S. concerns.' 2 These, and other developments, 173
support the conclusion that termination of the Mutual Defense
Treaty was not so "fundamental" an event as to give rise to any
compelling legislative interests in participation in the termination
decision.
The termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty presents a dif-
ficult case, pitting several significant arguments for legislative par-
ticipation against competing presidential claims. Nonetheless, this
Comment takes the position that unilateral executive termination
of the treaty was constitutionally permissible. The treaty's termi-
nation involved no repeal of the "Law of the Land" and did not
threaten to disrupt settled legislative efforts. In addition, although
the treaty was important, unilateral presidential termination did
not leave Congress unable to participate in the formulation of the
nation's foreign policy. Consequently, the President's unilateral
decision to terminate implicated few of the legislative interests that
would be present, for example, if the Warsaw Convention were
terminated. Conversely, the President possessed significant claims
to control over the nation's military affairs and its international
commitments. Thus, while the conclusion is open to legitimate
dispute, the executive's interests in power to unilaterally terminate
the Mutual Defense Treaty appear to outweigh Congress's interests
in participating in the decision.
IV. A SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHO MAY
TERMINATE A TREATY
A. The Need for a Procedural Framework
The decision to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan apparently was made by President Carter and members of
his staff after little, if any, consultation with legislative representa-
171Id. 239.
172 E.g., id. 160-68 (statement of Robert Barnett).
173The awkwardness inherent in a U.S. refusal to recognize a government that
controlled some 900 million citizens was frequently mentioned. E.g., id. 8 (state-
ment of A. Doak Barnett), 208 (statement of Ray S. Cline). Similarly, the
economic implications of normalization of relations with the People's Republic were
an important consideration. E.g., id. 247-320.
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tives.174 Although a limited number of Senate leaders were in-
formed of the decision shortly before it was made public, 175 little
attempt was made to hear opposition or win support in Congress.
Indeed, the decision was cloaked in secrecy until its announce-
ment.170 This approach to the treaty termination created wide-
spread resentment among members of Congress.7 7 This section
examines the process by which the decision how to terminate a
treaty is made, and argues that a well-designed decision-making
procedure will eliminate much of the conflict surrounding future
treaty terminations.
Fundamental disagreement surrounds the theory (or theories)
of the separation of powers. 178 In the words of Louis Henkin,
174 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief fr 28, Goldwater v. Carter,
481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979), reprinted in Treaty Termination Hearings, supra
note 21, at 560; N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1978, at A12, col. 1 ("An aura of secrecy
surrounded the [normalization] negotiations."); N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1978, at A14,
col. 4 (quoting President Carter: "in the last two or three weeks . . . we did not
consult with anyone outside of a very tiny group within the Executive Branch of
Government ...... ); Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1978, at A12, col. 1; Personal
Interview with Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Rela-
tions, Jan. 19, 1981 (confirming absence of effective consultation with Congress)
[hereinafter cited as Interview]. But see Declaration of Richard Holbrooke ff 2,
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979), reprinted in Treaty
Termination Hearings, supra note 21, at 85-86. See generally HousE Co.mvs. ON
FonEGN ArpArs, 96th CoNG., 24 Szss., ExEcu=VE-LEGisiATI CONSuLTATiONS
ON CHmA POLICY, 1978-79 (Comm. Print 1980) (criticizing absence of consulta-
tion in normalization and termination decisions) [hereinafter cited as CHINA
PouC].
For critical discussions of the Carter administration's handling of foreign
affairs, particularly as regards consultation and coordination with the Congress,
see generally Hoffmann, A View from At Home: The Perils of Incoherence, 57
FoRmGN AFF. 463 (1978); Yankelovich, Farewell to "President Knows Best", 57
FoRmEoN ArF. 670 (1978). But see Bull, A View from Abroad: Consistency under
Pressure, 57 FOREiGN ArFF. 441 (1978).
.7
5 N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1978, at A15, col. 1 (quoting Senator Javits' response
to the question whether there had been "adequate" consultation with congressional
leaders prior to termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty and de-recognition of
Taiwan: "Obviously not."); Washington Post, Dec. 16, 1978, at Al, col. I (quoting
Senator Glenn: "Calling a few of us in one hour before he goes on television
doesn't seem like much consultation."); id. A12, col. 4 ("Congressional leaders
were briefed on the decision . . . [to de-recognize Taiwan and terminate the
Mutual Defense Treaty] three hours before the televised speech."). See generally
CHNA POLICY, supra note 174, at 3-5.
176 See note 174 supra. See generally CHINA POLICY, supra note 174, at 29-32.
177 N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1978, at A13, col. 1 ("the dramatic move by Mr.
Carter to abrogate the Taiwan treaty at the end of 1979 has ruffled a number of
Senators"); N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1978, at All, col. 1 (report of Senator Helms'
charge that administration deliberately misled Senate on the subject of normaliza-
tion plans). See CmImA POLICY, supra note 174, at 3-5.
17
8 See note 39 supra. See also W. ELoTr, supra note 61, at 44 ("The
Constitution did not define with precision the respective roles of the Congress and
of the President in foreign policy."); Casper, 61 VA. L. REv. 777 (1975) (re-
sponding to Henkin, supra note 60) ("the great abstraction of separation of powers
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"Major struggles for power between the President and Congress,
then, are about equally intractable under all theories of constitu-
tional power in foreign affairs." 171 As a result of this basic dis-
agreement, many allocations of governmental authority based upon
separation of powers principles, including those involving the treaty
termination power, will be open to powerful criticism.18 0 Thus, it
is particularly important that there exist a procedure for resolving
treaty termination disputes in a manner acceptable to both the
legislative and executive branches. If the legal and constitutional
resolution of treaty termination disputes seldom will be clear-cut,
the likelihood of conflict between the Congress and the President
will be increased. 81 Appeal to constitutional language, theory, and
interpretation will seldom be persuasive. 8 2 Instead, political con-
siderations, personal predilections, and institutional loyalties will
determine the actions of most participants in governmental
disputes.8 3
Several commentators, responding to the vagueness of separa-
tion of powers principles, have urged that Congress enact legislation
designed to define the respective spheres of executive and legislative
power 8 4 Such "framework legislation" is intended to inject a
degree of clarity and stability into governmental relations, by pro-
viding substantive guidelines and procedural mechanisms for re-
solving governmental disputes. 85 The preceding sections attempted
is only valuable as a starting point in describing the respective roles of Congress
and the President in formulating and implementing foreign policy").
179 L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 28.
180 See, e.g., Casper, supra note 44, at 482-83, 498 (discussing failures to
"legitimate" national foreign policy in 1970s).
181 See id. 468 (noting tendency to employ "political means of 'getting back"
at a President who had aroused congressional displeasure).
182 See id.
183 See id. 464-81; Henkin, supra note 60, at 754-57.
184 Balmer, supra note 49; Casper, supra note 44, at 481-82, 491-98; Barton,
Book Review, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1015 (1980).
185 Dean Casper, discussing the importance of "framework legislation," see
note 159 supra, made several points also applicable in this context:
Framework legislation thus forces both Congress and the President to
focus on constitutional considerations, which are ordinarily submerged in
disputes concerning specific policies. By providing institutionalized forms
for consultation and the resolution of disagreements, it also gives greater
specificity to the notion of legal constraints and attempts to stabilize to
a greater extent expectations about the ways in which governmental power
is exercised. Finally, by providing procedures for the evaluation and
control of exercises of presidential power, it strives for constitutional
legitimacy.
Casper, supra note 44, at 482 (emphasis added). A properly designed procedure
for deciding how to terminate a treaty would share many of these strengths, allow-
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to provide substantive guidelines for resolving treaty termination
disputes. As has been recognized, however, procedural guidelines
are equally important to the resolution of constitutional disputes
between Congress and the President. s68  Thus, one commentator
has linked an effective foreign policy to "changes in organization
and procedures both within the Executive and the Legislative
Branches themselves and for the conduct of relations between
them." 187 Congress, recognizing the strength of these observations,
has enacted several important pieces of legislation requiring the
President to meet certain procedural requirements (such as con-
sulting with specified congressional committees) before exercising
power delegated to him by the legislature.8s These kinds of pro-
cedural frameworks, aimed at reducing the ambiguity of the alloca-
tion of the foreign affairs power, have received widespread scholarly
approval. 89
Legislation is not, of course, the only means of establishing a
procedural framework for the resolution of disputes concerning
governmental powers.190 Either the development of informal gov-
ernmental practices, or the promulgation of regulations by the
President, could provide a basis for such a procedure. The im-
portant point is that a well-defined procedural framework for re-
solving treaty termination disputes might reduce both the frequency
and the costs of such disputes.
B. Objectives of a Procedural Framework
In designing a procedure intended to reduce the ambiguity
and potential for conflict created by treaty terminations, two con-
ing "focus on constitutional considerations," "providing institutionalized forms for
consultations," and "striv[ing] for constitutional legitimacy."
Another commentator, discussing conditions included in foreign assistance
legislation, applauded the procedural mechanisms established as a result of such
developments. Balmer, supra note 49, at 236-38.
186 E.g., T. FANic & E. WSBAND, supra note 48, passim; Bennet, Congress
in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?, 57 FoPEia= AF-. 40, 45-49 (1978); Casper,
supra note 44, at 481-82; Henkin, supra note 60, at 771-74; Bovine, Separation of
Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 INm. LJ. 397, 431 (1977).
1'82 Henldn, supra note 60, at 771.
188 E.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 502B, 75 Stat. 424 as amended by International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 301, 90
Stat. 748 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976)); Export Administration Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (to be codified in scattered sections of 50
U.S.C.).
189 E.g., Balmer, supra note 49; Casper, supra note 44; Henkin, supra note 60;
Bovine, supra note 186; Sparkman, supra note 49.
19o See Henkin, supra note 60, at 771-76; Bovine, supra note 186, at 431.
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siderations are important. First, the procedure should be unam-
biguously defined. Second, the procedure should maximize con-
sultation with Congress, while safeguarding legitimate executive
interests.
An unambiguous and predictable decision-making process
would inject a much-needed element of certainty into an otherwise
unclear area.191 Similarly, it would provide a forum, other than
the courts, 192 in which conflicting views might be advanced.
193
Finally, a clearly stated procedure would reduce ex post facto spar-
ring between the executive and legislature as to what constitutes
appropriate consultation. Much of the friction and antagonism
that surrounded the Taiwan treaty termination may have resulted
from the unorthodox and sudden character of the President's actions
and from the uncertainty of Congress when faced with an un-
familiar problem. 194 A clearly defined procedure would alleviate
such problems and allow both the executive and the legislature to
focus on the underlying issues presented in specific cases.
The importance of consultation between the legislature and
executive has been emphasized frequently. Consultation is likely
191 See notes 178-79 supra & accompanying text.
Commentators have frequently noted the importance of an established and
consistent decision-making procedure in similar contexts. For example:
If the executive branch and Congress are able to agree on what con-
sultation should involve, which members of Congress are to be consulted,
and at what point in the decision-making process consultation ought to
occur, the potential for conflict and confrontation between the two
branches can be reduced and a better working relationship facilitated.
Hamilton & Van Dusen, Making the Separation of Powers Work, 57 FomGN AFF.
17, 33-34 (1978). See Bennet, supra note 186; Casper, supra note 44, at 482
(noting advantages of "institutionalized forms for consultation and the resolution
of disagreements").
Thus, it was recently argued that:
Effective prior consultation, better information flow and education on the
issues are the best available vehicles to lubricate the foreign policy process,
reduce frictions and ensure that out of any foreign policy debate over
what policy to pursue there emerges a coherent strategy that has been sig-
nificantly strengthened by congressional participation.
Hamilton & Van Dusen, supra, at 39.
3
92 
It is unlikely, given the Goldwater case, that courts would resolve future
treaty termination disputes. See notes 14-18 supra & accompanying text. Thus,
the existence of an alternative forum becomes all the more important. See Casper,
supra note 44, at 464-74.
193 See Casper, supra note 44, at 482; Hamilton & Van Dusen, supra note 191,
at 28-29.
194 See notes 174-78 supra & accompanying text.
One writer has speculated that the standard State Department procedure for
entering treaties was used in deciding how to terminate the Taiwan treaty. VAN.
Note, supra note 2, at 134 n.4. Officials at the State Department did not confirm
this scenario. Interview, supra note 174.
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to increase the support, both political and popular, of the nation's
foreign policy. It also tends to legitimate foreign policy positions
by dispelling perceptions of presidential autocracy.195 Consultation
may also increase the quality and effectiveness of the nation's foreign
policy. Finally, consultation serves to restrain possible abuses of
executive power.196  Although far from a panacea, 197 consultation
between the President and Congress seems likely to contribute to a
more effective foreign policy.
It is important, however, that the procedures for consultation
be designed to allow actual legislative contribution to the decision-
making process. Thus, consultation should include a presentation
of underlying information to legislative members and should allow
opportunities for exploration of the issues raised by such informa-
tion.198 Similarly, the consultation process should occur prior to
the implementation of any decisions, and should be sufficiently
flexible to permit alteration of executive plans as a result of legis-
lative comments.199 Absent opportunity for effective congressional
input, the consultation process would accomplish little and would
quickly be perceived as a sham.
The consultation process should also be designed to preserve
the institutional strengths that the executive branch brings to
foreign policy decision-making-secrecy, speed, and consistency. 200
Thus, commentators have urged that consultation focus upon
selected members of the Congress, such as party leaders and com-
mittee chairmen. 20 1  This approach would minimize information
leaks, and the accompanying embarrassment to both the United
States and foreign governments, and would allow relatively swift
governmental decision-making. Although this approach plainly
limits the scope of consultation, it appears necessary to avoid the
costs of prior consultation with all 535 members of Congress.
195 E.g., Bennet, supra note 186; Casper, supra note 44; Chace, Is a Foreign
Policy Consensus Possible? 57 ForEIGN AFr. 1 (1978); Hamilton & Van Dusen,
supra note 191; Katzenbach, supra note 63.
198 See authorities cited in note 195 supra.
19 7 See Cutler, To Form A Government, 59 FOREIGN Arr. 126, 138-39
(1980); Hamilton & Van Dusen, supra note 191, at 35.
198T. FA Ncz & E. WEIsBAND, supra note 48, at 227-57; Bennet, supra note
186, at 45-48; Hamilton & Van Dusen, supra note 191, at 32-39.
199 See note 198 supra.
200 See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
201 E.g., T. FRANcx & E. WELSBAND, supra note 48, at 210-26; Balmer, supra
note 49; Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional
Control Over the War Power, 71 Am. J. INT'L L. 605, 624-25 (1977); Henkin,
supra note 60, at 772-74; King & Leavens, supra note 46, at 91.
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C. Existing Models For Treaty Termination Procedure
There is surprisingly direct precedential support for the crea-
tion of a procedural mechanism to resolve constitutional disputes
involving treaties. Despite the lack of textual support in the Con-
stitution, Presidents frequently have entered into agreements with
foreign states without relying upon the treaty-making process. The
President has made thousands of "sole executive agreements," with-
out obtaining the approval of either the Senate or Congress.
202
These agreements are justified as an exercise of the constitutional
powers of the President, or as an exercise of power delegated to the
executive by treaty or statute.203  Similarly, "congressional-executive
agreements," approved by a majority of each house, frequently have
been made.204 Both types of executive agreement have international
effects identical to those of treaties: the nation is bound by inter-
national law to fulfill its obligations in good faith.20 5  Neither form
of agreement, however, receives the two-thirds senatorial approval
necessary to make a treaty. After considerable debate regarding
their constitutional propriety,206 executive agreements have received
general acceptance.20 7  Nonetheless, it was recognized that the use
of such agreements raised important constitutional issues.
Concerns about the use of executive agreements reached a
peak in the early 1970s. It was widely perceived in Congress that
the President was using "sole executive agreements" both too fre-
quently 208 and for unduly important agreements. 209 The executive
202 1 D. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LA.w 206 (2d ed. 1970), reprinted in
N. IxxcH, supra note 32, at 1012-15; Rovine, supra note 186, at 397-99; Comment,
Self-Executing Executive Agreements: A Separation of Powers Problem, 24 BusAr.o
L. REv. 137 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BuFFLo Comment].
203 Rovine, supra note 186, at 409-16.
204 D. O'CoNNELt, supra note 202; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law
Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903
(1959). Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14 COLum. J. TnASN AT'L
L. 434 (1975).
205 See note 34 supra & accompanying text.
200 See Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J.
616 (1945); McDougal & Lans, supra note 21, at 534 (part II); Rovine, supra
note 186; BumTALo Comment, supra note 202.
207See Rovine, supra note 186, at 409-16.
208 Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on
International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Congressional Review Hearings].
As of January 1, 1972, the United States was party to 947 treaties and 4,359
executive agreements. T. FRANcr & E. WmsswND, supra note 48, at 144-45 & n.86.
See L. HENmN, supra note 19, at 173 & n.1 (quoting Secretary of State Dulles:
"every time we open a new privy, we have to have an executive agreement");
Rovine, supra note 186, at 398 n.6 (providing annual statistics for treaties and
executive agreements).2 0 9 See Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 208, at 4.
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branch responded to this criticism 2 10 by clarifying the internal
procedures that the State Department followed in selecting the
appropriate form that international agreements would take.21' Two
recent commentators characterized the internal procedures imple-
mented by the State Department as a "felicitous move"; 212 legis-
lators generally have agreed.213 In light of their apparent initial
success, the State Department guidelines deserve closer examination.
The State Department procedure is expressly designed to pre-
vent "invasion or compromise" of legislative powers by the execu-
tive.214 Thus, if there is "any question whether an international
agreement should be concluded as a treaty or as an international
agreement other than a treaty, the matter is brought to the attention
of the Legal Adviser. If the Legal Adviser considers the question
to be a serious one that may warrant congressional consultation,"
further internal review is required.215  Finally, "[c]onsultations on
such questions will be held with congressional leaders and com-
210 Congress considered a variety of legislation designed to regulate the use
of executive agreements. See Rovine, supra note 186, at 399-401. The only such
proposal to be enacted was the Case-Zablocki Act, requiring the Secretary of State
to transmit the texts of all executive agreements entered into by the United States
to Congress. Act of August 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (codified
at 1 U.S.C. §112b (1976)).
211 State Department Procedures on Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments, Circular No. 175 (Oct. 25, 1974), 11 FOBmREN AFFAmS MANUAL 700 [here-
inafter cited as Treaty Procedure], reprinted in HouSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS & SENATE Comm. or FonmiGN RELATIONS, 95Ta CONG., 2D SESS.,
LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1977 at 89 (Joint Comm. Print 1978)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS]. See T. FRANcK & E.
WhasBAND, supra note 48, at 151 (quoting letter from Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to John Sparkman, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, reprinted in International Agreements Consultation Resolu-
tion, S. REP. No. 1171, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978)).
The State Department procedure is binding on State Department officials,
although it lacks the force of either law or a federal regulation. Rovine, supra
note 186, at 417 n.105.
See also J. BOYD, DIGEsT OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
413 (1977); E. McDowELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTEraATIONAL
LAw 294 (1975).
212 T. FRANcK & E. WmEBAND, supra note 48, at 151 ("a felicitous move in
reviving the Senate's advisory role"); see Rovine, supra note 186, at 406-21.
213 E.g., Letter from Senator John Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, to Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations, July 28, 1978, Washington, D.C., reprinted in S. REP. No. 1171, supra
note 211.
214 Treaty Procedure, supra note 211, at 721.3, reprinted in LEGISLATION ON
FoREN RELATIONS, supra note 211, at 91.
215 Treaty Procedure, supra note 211, at 721.4(b), reprinted in LEGISLATION
ON FOEMGN RELATIONS, supra note 211, at 91-92. The appropriate channels of
internal review within the State Department are set forth. Id.
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mittees as may be appropriate." 216 This procedure, by providing
for consultation and discussion with the legislative branch, has pro-
vided a useful approach to a difficult constitutional question that,
like the treaty termination issue, has a high potential for executive-
legislative dispute. Accordingly, it likely would provide a work-
able procedural framework for applying the substantive treaty
termination guidelines suggested earlier.
Although the Department of State procedure provides a useful
starting point for the development of a decision-making mechanism
in the treaty termination context, it might be improved by certain
changes. The requirement that a "serious question" exist before
consultation with the legislature occurs seems, at least on its face,
overly restrictive. Some lesser standard, less biased toward execu-
tive interests, would increase the opportunities for consultation
with the legislature and decrease the likelihood of heavy-handed
executive decision-making. Similarly, the proviso that consultation
occur "as may be appropriate" should be reformulated. A narrow
definition of those circumstances that will justify dispensing with
consultation would provide a desirable check on unilateral execu-
tive actions, while legitimate executive interests could be articulated
in the proviso. Finally, there should be some elaboration on the
provision that "appropriate" congressional leaders and committees
be "consulted." Although the precise types and manners of con-
sultation are beyond the scope of this Comment,217 whatever pro-
cedure is chosen should be clearly defined. For example, the
congressional leaders and committees who are to be consulted should
be specified, while leaving the door open to more extensive con-
sultations if necessary.21 8 Similarly, the manner of consultation-
formal briefing versus informal discussion-might be specified.
Such provisions would guarantee a minimum level of discussion and
information dissemination, and would make clear the fact that a
forum for opposition to proposed executive actions is available.
In sum, the internal State Department procedure for determin-
ing how to enter into an international agreement provides a useful
example in designing a procedure for deciding how to terminate
a treaty. It easily could be adopted in conjunction with the bal-
ancing test suggested earlier. Neither the existing process of con-
216 Treaty Procedure, supra note 211, at 721.4(c), reprinted in LEGIsLATxON
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 211, at 92.
217 For discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different types of
consultation, see generally I. DESTLER, supra note 46; Bennet, supra note 186;
Hamilton & Van Dusen, supra note 191, at 35-39.
2 1 8 See note 217 supra.
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sultation, nor the suggested changes, will prevent disputes. They
may, however, contribute to a swifter, more efficient resolution of
such conflicts by providing an element of certainty and a forum
for exchanging views.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has addressed the question whether the termi-
nation of a treaty requires legislative participation, or, rather, only
executive action. Observing that the United States is party to a
wide variety of treaties, it suggests that different treaty terminations
will implicate different congressional and presidential interests in
controlling the termination decision. Depending on the interests
implicated, unilateral presidential treaty termination will be per-
missible in some cases, while in others, legislative participation will
be required. A balancing test, looking to the various governmental
interests at stake in treaty terminations, was proposed for determin-
ing the appropriate manner of making a particular treaty termina-
tion decision. The Comment concluded by arguing that, whatever
test may be adopted, an established procedure for deciding who is
to participate in treaty terminations would be desirable. Relying
on existing State Department practices, one possible procedure has
been suggested.
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